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NOTES AND COMMENTS
JUDICIAL POWER TO COMPEL SUBMISSION
TO PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
Recognition by the Illinois Supreme Court, through the medium of
the holding in the case of People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey,' of the existence
of power on the part of a trial court to order the plaintiff in a personal
injury action to submit to a physical examination at the instance of the
defendant should serve to plug a major loophole in Illinois discovery
practice.2 The case in question, an original proceeding in mandamus3
to compel a trial judge to expunge an order that had required a plain-
tiff in a civil suit pending before him to submit to an examination to
determine the extent of his injuries arising from an automobile accident,
not only produced a holding supporting the order so entered but also
led to a specific overruling of all prior Illinois cases to the contrary.
Further effort to secure legislation on the point would now seem to be
unnecessary. Nevertheless, there is occasion to consider whether some
codification of the point in the form of a court rule on the subject might
not be desirable.
In the case mentioned, the Supreme Court, speaking unanimously
through an opinion drafted by Justice Schaefer, pointed out that the
doctrine of want of power to order a physical examination, first asserted
in Parker v. Enslow, 4 rested upon a holding unsupported by citation to
authority; that such a power had existed at common law ;5 and that courts
of other jurisdictions had recognized the presence of this power as being
one inherent in a trial court.6 Only two possible explanations to support
the earlier view were said to exist. One of these, the now outmoded "in-
violability of person" theory, had been expressed by a majority of the
judges of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Union Pacific
Railway Company v. Botsford,7 but was found to be inappropriate in the
110 Ill. (2d) 288, 139 N. E. (2d) 780 (1957).
2 See Esling, "Compulsory Physical Examination of Plaintiff in Personal Injury
Cases," 21 CICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 181 (1943), and O'Connor and Rosch, "Does
Illinois Need a Compulsory Examination Law," 42 111. B. J. 160 (1953).
3 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 2.
4 102 Ill. 272 (1882).
5 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d Ed., Vol. 4, § 2220, p. 723.
6 Cook v. Miller, 103 Conn. 267, 130 A. 571 (1925) ; Brown v. Il=utzler Bros. Co.,
152 Md. 39, 136 A. 30, 51 A. L. R. 177 (1927) ; S. S. Kresge Co. v. Trester, 123 Ohio
St. 383, 175 N. E. 611 (1931) ; Cohen v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 250 Pa. 15,
95 A. 315 (1915).
7 141 U. S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 35 L. Ed. 734 (1891).
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face of a basic principle in the law of evidence that "what is relevant is
admissible.' " The second, to the effect that the matter of requiring an
examination was one for the legislature not the courts, 9 was said not
only to ignore common law precedents which authorized such examina-
tions where necessary but struck more nearly against the inherent power
of a court to regulate matters relating to judicial procedure.' 0
Whatever the federal doctrine may one time have been, it is clear that
federal trial courts now possess the power to require the plaintiff to sub-
mit to a physical examination under an express rule on the point," which
rule was upheld and enforced in the case of Sibbach v. Wilson & Company,
Inc.12  While the last-mentioned case dealt specifically with the problem
as it related to a federal court, the holding therein would indicate that
any state court vested with rule-making power in relation to procedural
matters could impose a similar requirement, even in the absence of special
statutory authority.3 The step taken by the Illinois Supreme Court in
overruling the Parker case is, then, both a sound one and buttressed by
reason.
Aided, in all probability, by the achievement accomplished by federal
courts, the Illinois Supreme Court, in the course of the opinion afore-
mentioned, summarized the conditions it would require to be observed
in order to call the power as to examinations into operation. In that
connection, it noted that the petition for the entry of the order in ques-
tion before it had alleged (1) that the litigant was without information
as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries; (2) that he had
no means of getting that information except by an independent physical
examination; and (3) that the information was necessary to enable him
to prepare for trial. In addition it was noted (4) that there was no
suggestion by the plaintiff that the physical examination would involve
any unusual hazard; (5) no objection had been made as to the competence
of the examining physician, or as to the unreasonableness of the time and
place fixed for the examination; and (6) the petitioner had stated that
8 See 10 Ill. (2d) 288 at 293, 139 N. E. (2d) 780 at 783.
9 People ex rel. Wayman v. Steward, 249 Ill. 311, 94 N. E. 511, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.)
259 (1911).
10 People v. Callopy, 358 Il1. 11, 192 N. E. 634 (1934). Legislative interference
with that power would be unconstitutional according to Agran v. Checker Taxi Co.,
412 Ill. 145, 105 N. E. (2d) 713 (1952).
11 28 U. S. C. A., Fed. Rules of Civ. Pro., Rules 17 to 51, but particularly Rule
35(a).
12312 U. S. 1, 61 S. Ct. 422, 85 L. Ed. 479 (1941).
Is See note In 19 CmICAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw 198.
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all incidental expenses would be borne by him.14 These requirements are
substantially similar to those existing in most of the states which recognize
this power, 15 but it should be emphasized that the exercise of the power,
where it exists, is not a matter of absolute right in favor of the defend-
ant, being more nearly one within the discretion of the trial court and
subject to review only in case of a clear showing of an abuse of dis-
cretion.16
Concerning the extent of the examination that can be so made, it is
well settled that no court would have authority to compel a plaintiff
to submit to an examination that might endanger his health so, while
x-ray examination 1 7 and blood-testing' 8 has been permitted, requests have
been denied, as being too hazardous, in cases where the plaintiff was asked
to undergo an electrical test 19 or to submit to an excision of cells from
a growth, amounting to an operation, even though the operation could
well lessen the effect of the injury.20
In line with the other conditions noted by the Illinois Supreme Court,
it has been held that the person to be examined may base an objection
upon the character and professional standing of the examining physician,
but may not merely advance a personal dislike. 21  It would, however, be
appropriate for a female plaintiff to insist upon being examined by a
physician of the same sex. 22 There must be a timely request for the
examination, 23 the time and place of which must be reasonable, and the
expense must be paid by the party making the request.24 Whether more
than one examination may be granted depends upon the particular cir-
cumstances of each case, but the prevailing view is that a failure to make
or complete an examination when a full opportunity existed to do so, or
a failure to show the presence of some new development, will cause the
14The statement of the requirements appears in 10 II. (2d) 288 at 294, 139
N. E. (2d) 780 at 784. The court commented on the fact that the order was silent
as to the "expenses" to be borne by the petitioner but assumed they would include
reimbursement of the plaintiff for "any wages" he might lose by complying with
the order.
15 See cases collected in an annotation in 51 A. L. R. 183.
16 S. S. Kresge Co. v. Trester, 123 Ohio St. 383, 175 N. E. 611 (1931).
'7 See cases collected in an annotation in 108 A. L. R. 142, particularly p. 145.
is Hayt v. Bresster & Gordon Co., Inc., 199 App. Div. 68, 191 N. Y. S. 176 (1892).
19 Sterns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 177 Ky. 698, 198 S. W. 54 (1917).
2OAndrus v. Fomfara, 3 N. J. Misc. 261, 127 A. 788 (1925).
21 Black v. Biogier, 139 Misc. 100, 248 N. Y. S. 555 (1931).
22 In Bloom v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp., 151 Misc. 136, 272 N. Y. S. 511
(1934), an order was vacated which directed a male physician to examine a female
infant.
23 O'Brien v. Sullivan, 107 Neb. 512, 186 N. W. 532 (1922).
24 Boggs v. Gosser,-Mo. App.-, 55 S. W. (2d) 722, 108 A. L. R. 142 (1932).
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right to be forfeited, particularly so where to grant the request would
delay the trial.
25
While existing precedent elsewhere may be said to hav'e covered most
of the problems apt to arise in this connection, there is one point not
touched upon by the Illinois Supreme Court at the time it decided the
Dempsey case. The opinion notes that the order granted therein re-
quired that the plaintiff be given a copy of the report and findings of
the examining physician, 20 but it is possible that this may have been
based on an agreement between the parties who directed their principal
attention to the fundamental question concerning the presence or ab-
sence of a judicial power to enter an order on the point. There is occasion
to doubt whether, if questioned, this particular provision in the order
would have stood up under a direct attack. In the recent Ohio case of
Schroeder v. Cincinnati Street Railway Company,27 for example, the in-
jured plaintiff, following upon ani order for a physical examination, re-
quested that the physician be required to file a copy of his report with
the clerk of the court. Although the court found that the examination
was necessary to enable the defendant to prepare its defense, the court
said there was no compelling reason why this report should be recorded
so it denied the plaintiff access thereto. A somewhat similar result was
recently attained in the New York case of Swiatlowski v. Kasprzyk,
28
except that, in New York, the power to compel a plaintiff to submit to
an examination rests upon a statute.29  A majority of the court there
felt that it would be unfair to require the defendant to furnish the plain-
tiff or the plaintiff's attorney with a copy of the medical report without
requiring that the plaintiff also furnish the defendant with copies of
medical reports previously obtained by him. That holding was said to be
justified on two grounds, to-wit: (1) the sole purpose of the examination
was to remedy the defendant's lack of knowledge as to the nature and ex-
tent of the injuries, and (2) no language could be found in the pertinent
statute which could be said to require that the information obtained
should be shared with the plaintiff.
This specific point has been covered, for the federal courts, under
Federal Rule 35(b) (1). It declares that the person examined may re-
quest a copy of the report of the examining physician, including his find-
ings and conclusions, but after such request and delivery of this report,
the party causing the examination shall be entitled, upon request, to receive
25 See annotation in 108 A. L. R. 142 at p. 150.
28 10 Ill. (2d) 288 at 290, 139 N. E. (2d) 780 at 781.
27 139 N. E. (2d) 129 (Ohio Com. Pleas, 1957).
283 App. Div. (2d) 261, 160 N. Y. S. (2d) 362 (1957).
29 New York Civ. Prac. Act, § 306.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
from the party examined a like report of any examination previously or
thereafter made. If the party examined refuses to deliver any such
report, the court may on motion, require delivery on such terms as are
just and, if the examining physician refuses or fails to comply, the court
may exclude his testimony at the trial. There is reason to believe, there-
fore, if a trial is to be based on a full disclosure of all relevant evidence,
that the adoption of a similar rule in Illinois would be both appropriate
and desirable.
Similarly left unsettled for the moment, at least in Illinois, is the
nature of the action to be taken in the event the plaintiff should refuse
to obey the order of the court directing him to submit to a physical ex-
amination. Several courses of action might be available but only in the
federal courts can it be said that procedures to cope with this problem
have been established. 30  Such a plaintiff there may be held in con-
tempt;31 the physical condition of the party in question may be taken
as established, for the purpose of suit, in accordance with the claim of
the party requesting the examination; the disobedient party may be
denied the right to introduce evidence as to his actual physical condition;
further proceedings in the case may be stayed until the order is obeyed;
the action may be dismissed without prejudice; or it might be possible
to render a judgment as by default against the recalcitrant party. In
the absence of a specific rule on the subject, however, an Illinois court
may have difficulty finding support for any of these sanctions, particularly
in a case where the plaintiff is a non-resident of the state.32
To agitate further for the adoption of legislation in this state covering
these points would seem not only to be unnecessary but could well lead
to the same type of impasse which grew out of the effort to rectify the
unfortunate consequences stemming from an involuntary nonsuit produced
by oversight on the part of the plaintiff's attorney. 3 Since the Illinois
Supreme Court has seen fit to assert that there is a judicial power pres-
ently operating in the area under consideration, for which assertion it
is entitled to receive congratulation, it should now codify that power in
the form of a comprehensive court rule, preferably one modelled on the
80 See, In that connection, Fed. Rules Civ. Pro., Rule 37(b) (2).
31 Sibbach v. Wilson & Company, Inc., 312 U. S. 1, 61 S. Ct. 422, 85 L. Ed. 479
(1940).
32 See, for example, the case of People ex. rel. Prince v. Graber, 397 Ill. 522,
74 N. E. (2d) 865 (1947), which denied to a trial court the power to dismiss
a suit because a non-resident plaintiff had refused to come into the jurisdiction to
submit to pre-trial interrogation.
33 Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N. E. (2d) 713 (1952), noted in
30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 383, which declared Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch.
110, § 174a, unconstitutional as an infringement upon the power of the judicial
department.
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federal provisions but extending to a defendant who offers a counter-
claim.3 4  With the enactment of such a rule, it is conceivable that a
greater volume of out-of-court settlements without the necessity for trial
would be possible and, in those cases where trial might still be required,
the issues could be narrowed with the facts being impartially presented
for speedy decision.8 5
H. R. WINTON, JR.
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MUNICIPAL
FLUORIDATION OF WATER
It has been some eleven years since artificial fluoridation of water was
first utilized in any municipality in this country' but the extent of the
progress made in the use of this method for combatting tooth decay may
be seen in the fact that, according to a recent report, there are now 1,437
communities with a combined population of more than thirty million
people using artificially fluoridated water. 2 During the ensuing years there
has been a goodly amount of scientic and political as well as legal argu-
ment both for and against fluoridation. The scientific history of the sub-
ject has been well documented3 and the general press has covered the
political developments. It is the purpose of this note, therefore, to dis-
cuss the legal problems which have been raised, to point out how they
have been resolved elsewhere, and to consider how such legal problems
might be treated by an Illinois court.
Opinions have been published passing upon the legality of fluoridation
programs in seven jurisdictions to date with the United States Supreme
Court denying certiorari in four instances,' and at least one other case
34 See, in that connection, the case of Beach v. Beach, 114 F. (2d) 479 (1940).
35 If more should be needed, particularly in relation to the matter of obtaining
impartial medical testimony, attention should be given to an experiment developed
in New York and described in Marlen and Wright, Impartial Medical Testimony
(The Macmillan Co., New York, 1956).
1 The first pilot study of a national research program was set up in 1945 at
Grand Rapids, Michigan, according to Heustis, "Working Together To Save Teeth
in Michigan," 32 Today's Health 13 (1954).
2 Newsweek, March 18, 1957, p. 112.
3 The sources are collected in Report No. 140, entitled "Fluoridation of Municipal
Water Supply-A Review of the Scientific and Legal Aspects," Charles S. Rhyne
and Eugene F. Mullin, Jr., Issued by the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers, Washington, D. C., 1952. See also note in 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 343.
4DeAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. (2d) 674, 260 P. (2d) 98 (1953), cert. den.
374 U. S. 1012, 74 S. Ct. 863, 98 L. Ed. 1135 (1954) ; Chapman v. City of Shreveport,
225 La. 859, 74 So. (2d) 142 (1954), app. dis. 348 U. S. 892, 75 S. Ct. 216, 99 L. Ed.
701 (1954) ; Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N. E. (2d) 609 (1955),
app. dis. 351 U. S. 935, 76 S. Ct. 833, 100 L. Ed. 1463 (1956); Dowell v. City of
Tulsa,-Okla.-, 273 P. (2d) 859 (1954), cert. den. 348 U. S. 912, 75 S. Ct. 292, 99
L. Ed. 715 (1955) ; Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, 292 P. (2d) 134 (1956) ;
